China, Conspiracy Theory, Economics, Empire, Geopolitics, Politics, Propaganda, Russia, Social Media, Syria, US Empire, War

Nations Under Attack (Part 5): Resistance

“Where there is power, there is resistance.”

Michel Foucault.

Part 1 of this series argues that elites aggressively seek to acquire and control resources and power—primarily for their own personal enrichment. Part 2 outlines how the Western elites enact this agenda against nations that are targeted for resource pillage and inclusion within the broader sphere of Western influence for ongoing power projection and exploitation. Part 3 deals with narrative as a tool of war. Part 4 provides an overview of the common propaganda narratives used against key targets of the empire.

Part 5 provides an overview of how target nations have sought to counter the various methods of disruption and conquest used by the US War Machine. This article deals with state actions and responses that are or can be credibly construed as being designed to preserve the territorial, economic and social integrity of a state in the face of unfriendly actions using methods drawn from the US War Machine’s toolkit.

Introduction

While repressive actions tend to shock us, the motivations for ostensibly repressive or harsh measures and actions enacted by the government of a targeted nation need to be taken into account. Have these been instituted merely to benefit elite power interests (either domestic or foreign) by eliminating internal dissidents and opposition parties, or are they a response to unfriendly external forces directed against the nation and its people? The actions target governments take in response to such tactics are often portrayed as repression of freedoms and even as crimes against humanity, these tactics are also designed to  elicit reactions that can be used for propaganda purposes in support of further acts of aggression.

For instance, according to Tim Anderson in his book The Dirty War on Syria, in the early stages of the war in Syria relatively orderly demonstrations (related to the economic effects of a prolonged drought) in Daara were targeted by unknown snipers that indiscriminately shot and killed unarmed police and protesters alike. This resulted in a hardening of the attitudes of both protesters and police. Then armed, the previously unarmed Syrian police took a harsher stance in future protests, which inevitably led to an escalation of the violence. These harsher police actions were in turn used to construct a narrative against the Syrian government featuring accusations of brutality against protestors. This narrative was then used by the US government and others to justify supplying arms and support to ‘moderate opposition’ groups fighting against the Syrian government.

Countering the US War Machine

This section explores some of the strategies targeted nations have employed to counter the US War Machine’s key tactics, specifically:

a. Propaganda & Media Control

b. Economic Warfare

c. Arms Race

d. Terrorism

e. False Flag Actions

f. Military Conquest

g. Civil & Cultural Subversion.

a. Propaganda & Media Control

By creating their own media sources and using social media to disseminate their message, targeted nations have attempted to combat propaganda and media censorship. A key aspect of these propaganda initiatives is that they are often targeted at either domestic audiences (chiefly US and European residents) or at people in the target nations—and occasionally both. While the government of the target nation can sometimes combat the domestic propaganda and formal or informal censorship in the US and Europe, their efforts are often better directed at countering the effects of US propaganda on easily seduced, often Westernised, sections of their own domestic and expatriate populations.

Russia: The Russian government has sought to counter propaganda and disinformation initiatives by the US and UK using diplomacy and both traditional news formats and new forms of social media. Notwithstanding Western criticism that it has turned “its diplomats into disinformation warriors,” Russian government officials have used diplomatic initiatives, such as press conferences and social media posts, to advance their country’s position on global affairs. Both Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Maria Zakhorova, spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, maintain prominent social media profiles and are quoted extensively in the press on a range of issues affecting Russia and it’s areas of international concern. Foreign consular offices, such as the Russian Embassy in Australia, maintain active social media presences on platforms such as Telegram, X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook.

As well as use of state-controlled media organisations like RT and Sputnik News, which offer a largely Russian perspective on domestic and global events, the Russian government has embraced social media alternatives like Telegram and the VK social network platform (formerly known as VKontakte) to disseminate information from a Russian perspective, challenge the dominance of Western social media platforms and avoid Western censorship efforts. In addition to these Russian versions of Western social media platforms, a Russian alternative to Google has sprung up in the shape of Yandex, which offers the same sort of search engine, email, language translation, video sharing and map functions as many of its Western counterparts.

In an effort to more effectively reach Western audiences, RT has over the years employed and featured many predominantly English speaking commentators and presenters who have apparently been given wide scope to comment and express opinions without overt censorship or editorial interference—even where is has meant overt criticism of Russian government policies and actions:

“I was interviewed about my on-air statement on many major news stations, from BBC to CNN, where I defended my editorial freedom and also called-out the double standards and hypocrisies in their coverage. RT issued an official statement in support of my freedom to state my opinion on the network. Over the course of the next year, I continued to voice my concerns and opinions about Russia, from MH-17 to the Ukraine crisis, unfiltered.”

Abby Martin, Telesur,  8 January 2017

Among a range of political and social commentary provided by numerous op-ed writers, as at October 2023, RT features shows hosted by Peter Lavelle (Crosstalk), Afshin Rattansi (Going Underground), Scottie Nell Hughes (the 360 View), former CIA agent John Kiriakou (The Whistleblowers), and Rick Sanchez (Direct Impact). Prior personalities hosted on RT include investigative journalist, Abby Martin (Empire Files); Bitcoin enthusiasts, Max Keiser and Stacey Herbert (Keiser Report); ex-UK member of parliament, George Galloway (also on Sputnik as “Sputnik: Orbiting the world with George Galloway”); and Former first minister for Scotland, Alex Salmond. Many of the latter lost roles with RT when the UK regulatory body Ofcom announced the Russian state broadcaster’s license had been revoked with immediate effect in January 2022. However, notwithstanding the accusations of lack of balance levelled against RT by Ofcom, according to a report in the New York Times the channel’s viewing audience numbers made it at best a minor player in Britain, with RT drawing an average weekly viewership of 643,000 people out of a total British viewing audience of 55.2 million, or about 1.08 percent and daily viewership of about 187,000 people, or 0.31 percent of the total audience. An analysis from January 2022 shows a mixed result but still low direct viewership, although better penetration on Facebook. In spite of this seemingly lackluster penetration of Western audiences, US commentators such as General Laura Richardson, commander of United States Southern Command, is reported as lamenting that “Americans are on the back foot in the ‘informational domain,'” and that “The US government is not doing enough to counter the messaging of Russia and Venezuela in Latin America, a senior Pentagon official has claimed. Washington should “do better” in the “informational domain,… I’d say we are in a conflict in the information domain. In Latin America, we have over 31 million followers with Sputnik Mundo, Russia Today Espanol and teleSUR.”

While the governments of target nations like North Korea and China actively seek to eliminate what they perceive to be corrosive Western influences on their populations by limiting access to the Internet or implementing stringent controls over what can be accessed using tools such as the “Great Firewall of China“, the Russian approach has been less obtrusive. Although the Russian government attempted to block the Telegram messaging service in Russia, it failed miserably and in the end accepted and eventually adopted the platform, so that even a senior administration official like Maria Zakhorova has over 490,000 followers in late 2023. While Russians are generally able to access much the same external news sources and information as people living in Western nations, it appears that Russian propaganda focuses on portraying the West as decadent, corrupt, rotten and having reached its final phase.

However, in what might be regarded as retaliation for the banning of RT and Sputnik News in a number of Western countries, the Russian government has also taken legal action against Western media outlets it believes to be prejudiced or spreading false information, including suing them for defamation and cancelling their press credentials. As reported by Voice of America News in March 2022, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (all three being arms of US official propaganda networks aimed at the citizens of ex-Soviet nations) “suspended operations in Russia since the passage of a new law imposing a 15-year prison term for spreading “false news” on Russian military operations.” In October 2023, a Russian-American journalist, Alsu Kurmasheva, a Prague-based journalist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), was detained in Russia and charged with failing to register as a foreign agent, according to her employer, this follows on Wall Street Journal reporter, Evan Gershkovich, being arrested for alleged spying in March. This crackdown on anti-government reporting has also extended to Russian citizens, so that in April 2023, it was reported that Roman Ivanov, who operated the independent news website RusNews, was arrested when Russian officials reportedly broke down his apartment door and confiscated his laptop and phones; a Russian court later ordered that Ivanov be detained on three charges of spreading fake information about the Russian army.

Not unexpectedly, these moves by the Russian government have been framed in Western press as evidence of authoritarianism and repression of free speech and democratic values:

In Washington, White House National Security Council spokesperson Emily Horne issued a statement Saturday applauding steps by governments and other institutions to condemn “[Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s war of choice,” including “those that call out and contest the Russian Government’s further efforts to undermine the free press and spread disinformation.”

“With our partners, we will continue to condemn Russia’s shuttering of independent media and technology platforms that refuse to allow Putin to run his disinformation campaigns unchecked,” the statement said.

Kelu Chao, acting CEO of the U.S. Agency for Global Media, which oversees RFE/RL, Voice of America, and other networks providing unbiased news and information in countries where the press is restricted, said in a statement Friday, “It is clear that by restricting access to RFE/RL and VOA’s fact-based reporting, the Kremlin hopes to keep its own citizens in the dark and to hide the truth.”

Source: Voice of America News, 4 March 2022

In line with the Russian government’s granting of asylum and more recently, citizenship, to Edward Snowden, a number of Western alternative journalists have found a home in Russia in recent years. This has only grown since the start of the Russian Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine since when alternative journalists like Alina Lipp, Eva Bartlett, Patrick Lancaster and Mike Jones (@iEarlGrey) have joined long term ex-patriate residents like Russell (Texas) Bentley and Regis Tremblay reporting on events in Russia with many of these focusing particularly on the Ukrainian attacks on the people of the Donbass since 2014, as well as the Russian side of events connected to the SMO. The effect of their reporting has been to humanise the Russian side of the story and provide an alternative narrative—something for which they (and in the case of Lipp, her family members) have often been viscously persecuted by the governments of their own nations.

Notwithstanding the often hyperbolic scaremongering of vested US and European interests like the Rand Corporation’s “The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model,” or, more soberly, “Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe,” and a 2021 study by Douglas Wilbur of UTSA which cited Prop or Not, the now discredited propaganda outlet dressed as a fact checking site, to find ‘evidence’ that popular sites such as Zero Hedge echo Russian propaganda, so that “Covert manipulation of the U.S. news agenda presents a threat to U.S. national security,” and the consequent “need for US media to have a counter-attack against the propaganda weapons that Russia creates,” the reality of Russian propaganda efforts may be somewhat more modest, especially when compared to the pervasive and largely hidden power of the Western propaganda complex. Arguably, while not denying that the Russian government undoubtedly has a significant ongoing propaganda effort, this capability has been elevated to mythological status for US and European political purposes. For instance, the 2016 Russian election interference narrative based on the debunked Steele Dossier was employed by the Clinton campaign as a political tool against Donald Trump, who had expressed a conciliatory, business focused approach to dealing with Russia. Likewise, the UK secret service created Integrity Initiative (II) was found to have created a false narrative after the Anonymous hacking group released documents targeting Russia as supposedly “the greatest threat to world peace” and that “aggression is inherent in the Russian condition.”

In the UK the II is engaged in efforts to shut down uncooperative media outlets, accusing them of precisely the dirty tricks that it itself engages in. The most notable target is Russia Today (RT), which, II laments, is finding an audience because of “growing mistrust of western media among westerners.”

Source: Britain’s secret propaganda “Integrity Initiative” targets Russia, World Socialist Web Site, 4 February 2019

Syria: Through the course of the conflict in that nation the Syrian government has acted to combat the propaganda spread against it by the US and the West using a range of initiatives, such as:

  • Interacting with Foreign Media: In an effort to share their perspective on the current conflict, the Syrian government has made an effort to interact with international media outlets. They have permitted reporters like Eva Bartlett, Vanessa Beeley, Mark Taliano and Dr Tim Anderson to go to Syria and document what has been happening there. While an alternative viewpoint on the Syrian crisis has been provided by this endeavor, these efforts have come under fire from the Western media for regulating and restricting foreign media access in Syria. These attacks have often focused on the reporters and academics who have reported on and from the country in ways that conflict with the US and Western narrative—for instance, EUvsDisinfo (a  project of the European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force) published a ‘fact check’ hit piece on a talk Vanessa Beeley gave to a summer school at Uppsala University in Estonia and Brian Whitaker (former Middle East editor of The Guardian) has also attacked her reporting.
  • Social Media Campaigns: To counter the misinformation spread by Western nations, the Syrian government has employed social media sites like Twitter and Facebook, which they have also used to disseminate news and data regarding the current conflict in Syria. The Syrian government has had success using social media efforts to engage a larger audience and promote their point of view. On the other hand, there is evidence that pro-Syrian accounts and information have been censored and their reach restricted by Western media and governments.
  • Hosting Foreign Delegations: To highlight the realities of the crisis in Syria and refute the inaccurate narrative spread by Western nations, Syria has welcomed a number of international delegations made up of politicians, journalists, and activists. This initiative has been effective in exposing global audiences to the reality of the Syrian conflict. These delegations, however, have frequently come under fire from Western nations and media for being misled by the Syrian government.
  • Participation in International Forums: To refute the propaganda put forward by Western nations, the Syrian government has taken part in a number of international forums, such as the Syria International NGO Regional Forum, the Gulf International Forum, the International Forum for Religion and Peace in Moscow and the Kazan International Forum. They have explained their viewpoint and urged other nations to support them through various channels. While the Syrian administration has been effective in presenting their position on the current conflict through participation in foreign forums, this success has been somewhat tempered by counter measures such as Western nations and groups frequently criticising Syria for perpetrating war crimes and human rights violations, such as when Interpol faced criticism in 2021 for allowing Syria to rejoin its network.
  • Diplomatic Efforts: To counter the misinformation being pushed by Western nations, the Syrian government has engaged in diplomatic efforts to share their viewpoint on the current crisis and enlist assistance of other nations and international organisations. The success of the Syrian government’s diplomatic attempts has been uneven. Early in the war, the Syrian government was damaged when its ambassador to Iraq defected in July 2012 in protest over the government’s military crackdown on the then 16-month uprising. While nations like China and Russia have backed Syria, Western nations and organisations have sanctioned Syria and the US government has declared it a state sponsor of terror. While several other Arab nations, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar, have supported the conflict since it started, it seems that diplomatic efforts by Russia, the UAE and China have resulted in dramatic turn around in early 2023 with the March 2023 announcement that “Saudi Arabia and Syria will reopen their embassies after more than a decade of hostility, according to reports from multiple news outlets. The potential thaw comes after a landmark Chinese-brokered deal set the path for normalization of relations between the Saudi kingdom and Iran, bitter rivals who backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war.”

Overall, in spite of the Syrian government’s efforts Western nations and media have successfully positioned the Syrian government’s efforts by presenting it as an authoritarian regime that tramples on human rights and is to blame for the suffering of the Syrian people. As a result, the people of Syria have faced years of deprivation, hardship and war with little support from the international community. Large parts of the country—representing some of the most fertile, as well as key water supplies and oil producing areas—remain occupied by terrorist forces and military contingents of both the US and Turkey.

b. Economic Warfare

Targeted nations have made investments in their own infrastructure, formed alliances with other countries, and diversified their economies in an effort to resist the US War Machine’s economic warfare tactics.

Russia: Targeted sanctions, trade embargoes, and financial constraints are a few of the economic warfare tactics the US and its allies have used against Russia. These actions were intended to exert pressure on Russia and compel it to alter its conduct in areas including cybersecurity, human rights and foreign policy. Russia’s access to global markets and its ability to conduct business abroad have both been restricted by sanctions and trade embargoes. The goal of financial restrictions has been to keep Russia from transferring money to and from international banking networks. The Russian government responded by pursuing a program aimed at making the Russian economy more resilient to hostile economic tactics, including:

  • Increasing economic links with nations like China, India, and Turkey, which provide alternative markets and investment opportunities. In 2022, it was reported that for the first time in its history, Russia entered the top ten list of China’s trading partners, whereas China has long been Russia’s main trading partner. The value of their bilateral commerce in 2022 climbed by 29.3% annually to reach US$190.27 billion. Exports from China to Russia surged by 12.8% to US$76.12 billion while exports from Russia to China grew by 43.4% to US$114.15 billion.
  • Reducing reliance on Western financial institutions by establishing substitutes like the Eurasian Development Bank and the BRICS New Development Bank, the Eurasian HQ of the latter being located in Moscow .
  • Implementing an import substitution program that promotes domestic businesses and agriculture to reducing reliance on imports, especially from Western nations.
  • Reducing its reliance on the SWIFT interbank financial transaction system, including creating the Financial Messaging System of the Bank of Russia (FMSBR).
  • Promoting the use of alternate currencies including the yuan, euro, and ruble, and signing bilateral agreements with other nations to ease trade and financial transactions.
  • Pursuing a program of actively de-dollarising Russian foreign debt, replacing maturing USD liabilities with EUR and RUB debt.
  • Substituting US dollar assets in its National Wealth Fund (NWF) and government reserves with holdings in euros, Chinese yuan and gold. For instance, in February 2023, Russia Briefing reported that “Russia is now ranked in the global top four countries in terms of gold and foreign exchange reserves with a total of US$582 billion”.  
  • Demanding that “unfriendly countries” use rubles to buy the country’s oil and gas.

Sanctions imposed by the US and Western nations on Russia in 2022 in response to the Russian actions in Ukraine were intended to punish the country’s leaders and oligarchs by hitting the Russian financial industry and people close to President Putin. Yet while the EU’s foreign policy chief told DW in July 2022 that “sooner or later Russia will crumble”, by December 2022 NPR was conceding that “despite the sanctions — considered unprecedented in terms of scope, speed and coordination — Russia’s economy is still functioning, and the Kremlin is still waging war against Ukraine.” By 8 February 2023, a Bloomberg headline reported that “Russia Survived a Year of Sanctions by Investing as Never Before”. In contrast to a World Economic Forum (WEF) report in Dec 2022 which anticipated a 7-8% drop in Russian GDP in 2022-2023, by the end of January 2023 Newsweek was reporting that the IMF said that “Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth had gone into negative figures (minus 2.2 percent) in 2022” and “the IMF predicted that Russian GDP would rebound slightly in 2023 to 0.3 percent growth, and in 2024, the Russian economy is predicted to grow by 2.1 percent.”

Syria: Targeted sanctions, trade embargoes, and financial constraints are a few of the economic warfare tactics the US and its allies have used against Syria.

“The U.S. maintains a broad array of sanctions that effectively prohibit all nonhumanitarian trade between Syria and the United States. In addition, following the passage of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act in late 2019, starting in June 2020 the U.S. imposes a wider variety of secondary sanctions designed to deter certain categories of third-country trade with Syria. Stated policy objectives of U.S. sanctions on Syria, as reflected in language included in U.S. statutes, executive orders, and regulations, include combating WMD proliferation; punishing Syria over its support for terrorist groups and terrorist acts; pressure over human rights abuses and political repression, including the Syrian civil war; policy responses to Syria’s political interference in Lebanon and Iraq; and pressure on Syria’s ties to Iran, which are a top priority for the Trump administration.”

Source: U.S. and European Sanctions on Syria

These actions are intended to exert pressure on the Syrian government “push Assad’s government back into U.N.-led negotiations to end the country’s nearly decade-long war” and compel it to alter its actions in relation to terrorism, human rights, and the spread of weaponry. Financial restrictions were put in place to prohibit the Syrian government from using international banking systems and moving money, while trade embargoes and sanctions were employed to impede the Syrian government’s ability to export its commodities and access foreign markets. The effects of the economic warfare measures have been mainly felt by the weakest elements of society, such as children, women, and refugees. A humanitarian crisis has also been exacerbated by the measures, with many Syrians now finding it difficult to get food, medicine, and other needs. The Syrian government and those who support it were the intended targets of the economic warfare tactics, but the civilian population has been hardest hit and these effects have been made exponentially worse as a result of the 2023 earthquake in Turkey that affected northern Syria.

The Syrian government has adopted a number of initiatives in response to the economic warfare measures enforced by the US and its allies, including:

  • Strengthening economic ties with nations like Russia, Iran, and China, who have given Syria financial backing, chances for investment, and commerce.
  • Reducing reliance on imports, the Syrian government has also worked to diversify its economy by fostering homegrown businesses and agriculture.
  • Working to circumvent the economic restrictions using alternate financial methods, like bartering and cryptocurrencies.
  • Seeking to resolve the crisis and eliminate the economic sanctions by negotiating with opposition parties and through international governments.

While severely limited in its ability to mitigate the sanctions placed on the country, the Syrian government has done its best to persevere. One of the strategies Syria it is reported to have adopted is the use of a maze of shell companies to avoid sanctions on Assad regime’s elite. In February 2023, the US announced a 180-day exemption to Syria sanctions for disaster aid following the earthquake in Turkey which killed nearly 23,000 people in northwest Syria.

Overall, the situation in Syria is reported to be extremely difficult. With the food crisis, cholera outbreaks, unstable water supplies, and high electricity and petrol prices, the humanitarian situation in Syria has deteriorated. People have died, been injured, and displaced as a result of the recent earthquakes in Turkey and Syria. With 15.3 million Syrians already reliant on aid, the number of individuals in need of humanitarian relief has been steadily increasing. Slightly more than 90% of people are considered to be living in poverty.

c. Arms Race

Many targeted states have made investments in their own defense capabilities and formed partnerships with other countries in a effort to even the arms race created by the uni-polar hegemonic US War Machine. In the main, they have acted to leverage their strengths to provide a strategic advantage that nullifies the US War Machine’s formidable spending power or exploit the inefficiencies and contradictions inherent to the USA’s corrupt, bloated corporatised military industrial complex. Their ability to do so obviously highly depends on a range of factors, such as their existing economic resources, domestic industrial capabilities, military history and potential, existing or potential alliances, lack of internal corruption, oligarchic alignment and political and cultural cohesion. Iran and Russia illustrate a range of responses from nations occupying different positions on the geopolitical power spectrum.

Iran: Since the 1979 revolution, the Iranian government has developed and deployed a range of strategies to counter the US War Machine’s ostensibly superior military capabilities and and other security threats that have been arrayed against the nation. These strategies include:

  • Nuclear Program: While Iran maintains that its nuclear research and development initiatives are for peaceful purposes and that Ayatollah Khamenei has declared a fatwa over the development, production, stockpiling and use of of nuclear weapons, many Western powers have asserted that these programmes have potential military applications. The Israeli government, in particular, has been extremely vocal over many years in asserting claims that the Iranians have sought to develop nuclear weapons. For instance in 2019, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a repeat of many other such public accusations unveiled what he claimed was a previously undisclosed Iranian nuclear weapons facility and accused Tehran of destroying the site to hide the evidence. In line with these stated concerns, the Israeli government has engaged in a number of acts of terrorism and assassinations, cyber warfare and direct drone attacks against personnel and facilities it claims have been associated with Iranian nuclear weapons development. While the Iranians categorically deny any ambitions to develop nuclear weapons, their admitted capability to do so creates a degree of ambiguity which they have leveraged in Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations and diplomacy to ease sanctions and international pressure. Notwithstanding the debate over the reality of the claims made against Iran, the ambiguity serves as a form of nuclear deterrent against direct attack by the US and its allies in the region.
  • Regional Proxy Influence: Iran has established a number of longstanding relationships with non-state actors and proxy groups throughout the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and various militias in Iraq and Syria. These relationships allow Iran to exert influence in the region and deter potential adversaries. “For Iran, Hezbollah is a strategic asset that extends Iranian influence to the Mediterranean. Hezbollah’s rockets and missiles are tangible demonstration of the Islamic Republic’s anti-Israel credentials. But Hezbollah’s value to Tehran transcends the Lebanese theater. Hezbollah, like a “Beltway bandit” government subcontractor, has provided technical assistance and training to Iraqi militias supported by Iran and, more recently, Yemen.” (Brookings, 2019).
  • Ballistic Missile and Drone Development: Iran has an active ballistic missile programme which is focused on carrying conventional warheads and is seen as a regional deterrent and a means to project power. While some Western analysts contend that Iran’s missiles lack accuracy, in the wake of the US drone assassination of General Qasem Solemani in January 2020, Iran’s retaliatory strike against against US forces stationed at Ayn al Asad airbase in Iraq using Zolfaghar missiles demonstrated their ability to destroy military and critical-infrastructure targets reliably and with very high accuracy. As far back as the 1980s, Iran has developed a sophisticated military drone programme and by 2013 was reportedly suppling drones to Hezbollah and non-weaponized surveillance drones for the government of Syrian leader Bashar Al Assad. Early designs were supposedly copied from a US Sentinel drone which Iranian troops captured along the border with Afghanistan in 2011. Since the start of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine in 2022, a wealth of reports suggest that Iran has transferred both physical drones and drone technology to help develop Russia’s own drone programme. In February 2023, the Guardian reported that “Iran is emerging as a global leader in the production of cheap and lethal drones, according to US officials, who say Tehran is using the war in Ukraine as a shop window for its technologies.”
  • Cyber Warfare: Having experienced the damage that cyber warfare can wreak on critical facilities through the 2010 Stuxnet incident in which a malicious computer worm was used to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran has reportedly developed its own cyber warfare and hacking operations “To maintain pressure on its rivals despite these limitations, Iran has often relied on strategies described by many as “soft war”: less regulated, non-kinetic means of achieving its goals abroad by sustaining low-level conflicts for extended periods of time. One of Iran’s primary strategies in this regard is cyber warfare, including numerous attacks — with varying degrees of success — against both public and private sector targets in rival countries.” (Middle East Institute, 2021).
  • Asymmetric Naval Warfare: Iran has invested in asymmetric naval warfare capabilities, including naval mines, limpet mines and mini subs, swarming small boats, and anti-ship missiles. These low cost weapons systems pose a significant threat to US and its allies’ naval forces and shipping, complicating military planning and threatening high cost military assets, especially in the busy and highly restricted waters of the Persian Gulf.
  • Domestic Military and Defense Industry: Being subject to an array of US primary and secondary sanctions for many years, Iran has invested in its domestic defense industry to reduce its reliance on foreign arms imports. Since 1992, Iran has manufactured its own weapons and weapons systems, including tanks, armoured personnel carriers, missiles, radars, boats, submarines, UAVs and fighter planes. This intensive programme of self-reliance continued a trend started in 1963, when the Shah set out to make the Iranian armed forces the best non-atomic military in the world. Under the Shah, “Iran placed all military factories under the Military Industries Organization (MIO) of the Ministry of War. Over the next fifteen years, military plants produced small arms ammunition, batteries, tires, copper products, explosives, and mortar rounds and fuses. They also produced rifles and machine guns under West German license. In addition, helicopters, jeeps, trucks, and trailers were assembled from imported kits.” (Global Security).

Russia: Modern Russian military capabilities are founded on a strong base developed in the post-WW2 Cold War period which saw the USSR leveraging its advanced industrial capabilities to counter the arms race and security challenges posed by the US War Machine and its associated military alliances. During the post-WW2 era, as well as developing strategic nuclear missiles, the USSR invested heavily in its air defense systems, starting development of the S-200 (NATO: SA-5 Gammon) medium to high altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) system in the 1950s and the 2K22 ‘Tunguska’ air defense of motorised rifle and tank units (forerunner of today’s Pantsir system) during the 1970s. Likewise, the USSR leveraged German submarine innovations to build a fleet of fast, modern ocean-going submarines and continued to build and deploy diesel-electric attack and ballistic missile submarines throughout the Cold War. By 1960, the USSR had launched its first nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines.

Following the Cold War era and after Vladimir Putin came to power in 2012, the Russian military academy was re-engineered and many of the ‘progressive’ changes wrought on the Russian military capabilities during the Yelstin years—when a lot of Russian policy was written by Western consultants—were reset. In this context and reflecting the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2001, the Russian government embarked upon a comprehensive modernisation programme, including the development of game changing nuclear and hypersonic missile capabilities. Writing in his 2018 book “Losing Military Supremacy: The Myopia of American Strategic Planning”, military analyst, Andrei Martyanov contends that “What happened on March 1 this year with the announcement and demonstration of new Russian weapons is not asymmetry, it was the declaration of the final arrival of a completely new paradigm in warfare, military technology and operational art.”

Russian strategies have subsequently evolved into a multifaceted approach focused on fostering home grown capabilities that reduce reliance on imported componentry, making the nation less vulnerable to sanctions and other forms of economic warfare. Some key elements in this multifaceted approach include:

  • Military Modernisation Program: Russian military capability has been greatly enhanced the development and acquisition of advanced weapons systems, such as the S-400 air defense system, the Armata tank, the Kinzhal hypersonic missile and a range of six new classes of nuclear and conventionally powered submarines. As well as Russia maintaining a robust nuclear arsenal as a key element of its defense strategy, Russia has invested in the modernisation of its nuclear forces, including the development of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—such as the Avangard hypersonic boost-glide vehicle and the Sarmat—and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
  • Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Strategy: Russia has developed an A2/AD strategy to limit the ability of Western forces to operate freely near its borders and in areas of strategic interest. This includes the deployment of advanced anti-ship missiles, air defense systems, and electronic warfare capabilities. In 2022, Russia reportedly fielded its S-550 new mobile anti-satellite (ASAT) missile system, which is claimed to be able to “hit spacecraft, ballistic missile re-entry vehicles and hypersonic targets at altitudes of tens of thousands of kilometers.”
  • Cyber and Electronic Warfare: Russia is known for its sophisticated cyber capabilities and has been accused of engaging in cyberattacks and information warfare against Western countries. Russia’s sophisticated electronic warfare systems have proven to be able to disable and divert modern guided missile and drone systems.
  • Regional Influence: Russia seeks to maintain influence in neighboring regions, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, by suppressing colour revolution activities (such as the attempted coup against the government of Belarus in 2021 and in Kazakhstan in 2022), deploying military forces (as was done in 2008 when the Georgian government attempted to recapture South Ossetia by force of arms) and fostering political and economic ties with friendly governments through initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), OPEC+ and BRICS. In a wider scope, Russia has offered support to nations like Venezuela, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and Niger (via Wagner group) in their efforts to evade colonial domination, sanctions and other means of warfare waged against them by the US and its allies. The Russian government has forged a key relationships Iran, where Russia and Iran have been “deepening their military ties in a joint challenge to perceived US hegemony in the Middle East” for many years and this has been leveraged during the SMO in Ukraine to transfer Iranian developed advanced drone technologies to the battlefield.
  • Diplomacy and Arms Control: While the Russian government actively engages in diplomatic efforts and promotes arms control agreements to manage tensions and reduce the risk of arms escalation, these initiatives have largely been frustrated by US withdrawal from agreements like the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2001, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019 and the Open Skies Arms Control Treaty in 2020. In June 2002, the Russian announced its withdrawal from START II treaty due to US refusal to ratify the Treaty and US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. In 2023, the Russian government suspended its participation in the New START treaty, citing “diametrically opposed and irreconcilable views”; however, in hinting at terms for returning to New START, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov indicated in June 2023 that “any progress on arms control is possible only if the US gives up its “fundamentally hostile” policies.”
  • Domestic Defense Industry: Russia has invested in its domestic defense industry to reduce reliance on foreign arms imports. It exports its weapons and military equipment to various countries, generating revenue and building strategic relationships. It’s ability to produce sophisticated military and civilian aircraft, submarines, missile systems and space rockets is a testament to Russian technological and industrial production capabilities. While Western propaganda would have us believe that “Russia has tried to resist technological sanctions by import substitution, but without success,” it is reported in both Russian and independent Western sources that Russian military-industrial complex has significantly increased the production of weapons in 2023.
  • Space and Satellite Capabilities: Russia maintains advanced space capabilities, including satellite technology, which have military and strategic significance. As well as being a supplier of space launch vehicles to the US up to early 2022 (Russia halted supplying rocket engines to the US in 2022 in retaliation for sanctions against the country), in 2023 Roscosmos recorded its 100th consecutive successful launch to the International Space Station (ISS) and in 2022 the Russian space agency unveiled a mockup of its proposed new orbital station after having revealed earlier in the year that it plans to leave the ISS after 2024. In 2002, Russia launched its first GLONASS global positioning satellite system, the Glonass-K2 version of which was announced in 2017, however while GLONASS has been reportedly less accurate than the GPS system operated by the US, a development programme due to complete in 2027 is expected to see the system’s accuracy and reliability being enhanced, which comes in addition to its claimed advantages of “high noise immunity, resistance to various electromagnetic pulses, solar flares and the likely effects of electronic warfare.” It is a matter for speculation as to whether the Russians have enhanced GLONASS in the context of needs arising from the SMO in Ukraine; however, a Best Sat Nav article dated Sept 2023 indicates that the system is already extremely competitive when compared to the US GPS system.

d. Terrorism

Targeted nations have sought to counter terrorism by developing strong counter-terrorism strategies and forming alliances with other nations to combat terrorism on a global scale.

Syria: Since the US’s proxy war against Syria started in 2011, the Syrian government has identified the forces acting against the government as terrorists and waged an intense war against these forces. Speaking at the UN General Assembly,  Fayssal Mekdad, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of Syria acknowledged that “Syria is one of the countries most affected by that scourge, confirmed that his country will continue the fight against it, and ensure that “State authority, security and stability are restored.”” 

Syria turned to Russia for support against the Western backed forces and economic warfare assailing the nation and Russia has given the Syrian government financial and military support. At the Syrian government’s request, Russia began a military engagement in Syria in September 2015 with the explicit goal of pursuing terrorist organisations like ISIS and Al Qaeda. Syrian government troops have received military hardware and training from Russia in addition to airstrikes conducted against terrorist factions. Moscow has also participated in diplomatic efforts to end the Syrian crisis, such as the Astana process, which enlists Russia, Iran, and Turkey as guarantors of a cease-fire in Syria. Also, Russia has played a significant role in talks at the UN aimed at ending the conflict.

Source: Xinhua

Apart from the numerous examples of Syria’s fight against the Western backed insurgents and terrorists being used as propaganda supporting strikes against the country and the imposition of ever more dire economic sanctions. Since entering the conflict on Syria’s side, Russia’s support for Syria has also come under intense criticism in Western media with headlines such as: “The Real Reason Russia Is ‘Helping’ Syria” (Time, 30 Sep 2015), “Why is Russia Still Supporting Syria?” (Pursuit, Melbourne University), “Russia’s Payback Will Be Syria’s Reconstruction Money” (Foreign Policy, 5 May 2019), “What has Russia gained from five years of fighting in Syria?” (Al Jazeera, 1 Oct 2020), and “Five years of Russian aid in Syria proves Moscow is an unreliable partner” (Atlantic Council, 8 June 2021).

Iran: The People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), which the US categorised as a terrorist organisation in 1997 but delisted in 2012, is one of the Iranian opposition groups for which the US has historically provided support. The US has supported the MEK since the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, when the group was engaged in combat with the Iranian government. Despite being labeled a terrorist organisation in 1997, the US continued to help the MEK by providing funds and training. The Iranian government views the MEK as a terrorist group and has attempted to thwart its operations by weakening the MEK’s operations and legitimacy using a multifaceted strategy, combining propaganda, diplomatic pressure and security measures. These measures include:

  • Negative media campaigns and propaganda: The Iranian government has waged propaganda and negative media campaigns against the MEK, portraying it as a terrorist organisation and drawing attention to its contentious past.
  • Diplomatic pressure: Iran has urged other nations to take action against the MEK’s operations and has advocated for the group to be labeled as a terrorist organisation by the US and other nations.
  • Security measures: There have been reports of assassination attempts, kidnappings, and other violent crimes against MEK members both inside and outside of Iran.
  • Legal action: Legal action has been taken by the Iranian government against the MEK, including the indictment of the group’s leadership in absentia and requests for the extradition of MEK members from other nations.
  • Intelligence operations: Iran has engaged in espionage operations against the MEK, including infiltrating the organisation and acquiring data on its operations.

China: The Chinese government has accused the US of meddling in its domestic affairs and, in particular, of sponsoring terrorism in China’s Xinjiang region. According to an article in the South China Morning Post dated 14 Apr, 2021, a spokeswoman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that the US has supported ‘terrorist forces’ in Xinjiang with financial aid and other forms of assistance and has employed these organisations to sow discord and encourage separatism, “To support his allegations, Zhao played a video from 2015 in which a former contract translator for the FBI, Sibel Edmonds, said the US government funded terrorist attacks in Xinjiang to cut China off from its energy suppliers in Central Asia.” Terrorist incidents in, and associated with, Xinjiang which served as the foundation for Chinese government actions include:

  • The riots in Urumqi in 2009: In July 2009, clashes between Han Chinese and Uighurs erupted in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. At least 197 people died and 1,700 more were hurt during the riots.
  • The 2013 Tiananmen Square attack: A car rammed into a crowd of people in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in October 2013, killing two persons and injuring 40 more. A month later, it was reported that a radical Islamist group had claimed responsibility for the attack on Tiananmen Square and warned of future attacks in the Chinese capital.
  • The 2014 Kunming attack: In March 2014, a group of knife-wielding assailants attacked a train station in Kunming, Yunnan province, killing 31 people and injuring over 140 more. Separatist Uighurs were blamed for carrying out the attack.
  • The 2015 Kashgar attack: In July 2015, it was reported that assailants in the Xinjiang city of Kashgar used explosives and knives to kill 18 people and hurt dozens more.
  • The 2019 Xinjiang attack: In a planned assault on a police checkpoint in southern Xinjiang in November 2019, a group of assailants killed at least 15 people and injured dozens more.

The Chinese government has responded to these attacks by enacting a number of security measures, such as heightened monitoring, limitations on cultural and religious rituals, and the incarceration and imprisonment of several Uighur Muslims. Notably, Western human rights groups have protested these policies for allegedly violating people’s constitutional rights and freedom of religion. A policy of economic growth has also been followed by the Chinese government in Xinjiang with the intention of fostering stability and eradicating poverty. However, China’s responses to these attacks have been widely slated by Western media, political figures, US think tanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), expatriate Uyghur organisations and Human Rights organisations like Human Rights Watch (HRW) for “using high-tech surveillance to subdue minorities”, use of internment camps, and genocide. See also China: On the Balance of Evils.

e. False Flag Actions

Targeted nations have attempted to deter false flag operations by drawing attention to them and criticising the hypocrisy of the US Machine.

Syria: The Syrian and Russian governments have repeatedly warned of the risk of false flag gas attacks by terrorist organisations linked to al-Qaeda. Several organisations have been charged by the government of attempting to implicate the government in the deployment of chemical weapons in order to spur outside military action. Officials in Syria have cited earlier instances in which terrorist organisations have used chemical weapons and then accused the government of carrying out the attacks.

In one prominent event, it was claimed that the Syrian government deployed chemical weapons against people in Douma in April 2018. These accusations were refuted by the Syrian government, which claimed that the incident was a false flag operation carried out by the terrorist organisation Jaish al-Islam in coordination with Western intelligence services. However, Without even waiting for an official investigation, the Trump administration ordered airstrikes by the US, France, and the UK against Syrian government targets just a week or so after the event being reported. The claims of government responsibility for the attack were supported by the US based NGO, Human Rights Watch, and US and UK funded organisations such as the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) (reportedly funded by the CIA associated USAID) and the Syrian Civil Defense (White Helmets) (established by ex-MI6 operative James Le Mesurier and reportedly funded by the various NATO states). Further support for the accusation against the Syrian government came from Bellingcat, an Atlantic Council and US/UK funded organisation—which has been accused of “laundering national security state talking points into the press”—that has been instrumental in creating and maintaining narratives against Syria and Russia. Notably, Bellingcat has maintained a database of alleged Syrian government chemical weapons attacks that has been drawn almost exclusively from unverified reports from US, NATO, Saudi and Gulf States funded rebels and terrorist organisations, including al Qaeda under its various guises and the White Helmets. Bellingcat was also instrumental in forming the open source “evidence” that, at least in part, led to Russia being accused on the MH17 downing on 17 July 2014 and Bellingcat also claimed responsibility for identifying the two Russian agents said to have perpetrated the Skripal poisoning in Salisbury in 2018. An official OPCW report was eventually produced that supported the accusations against the Syrian government, although these conclusions were at variance with the evidence gathered by the organisation’s site investigators. See also: The OPCW’s Fall – Just Another Suborned and Discredited International Body).

Notwithstanding the Syrian government’s denials and the evidence of several whistleblowers from the OPCW concerning the Douma incident, US and Western agencies have successfully set the narrative of the Syrian government’s responsibility for a series of gas attacks, of which the Douma incident is just one example. The extent of this success is seen in at least four UN reports that support US and UK assertions that the Syrian government has employed chemical agents against its own people. However, former OPCW inspection team head and engineering specialist Ian Henderson testified before the UN Security Council on 20 January 2020 that although the investigation in Douma, Syria, revealed no chemical attack occurred, this fact had been suppressed by the OPCW. In a speech to the United Nations Security Council on 24 March 2023, Aaron Maté of The Grayzone criticised the OPCW for continuing to conceal its investigation into the alleged April 2018 chemical attack in Douma. Maté also refuted the OPCW’s most recent attempts to cover up the scandal, as detailed in a new report released by the organisation’s Investigation and Identification Team (IIT).

Russia: A number of events have been attributed to the Russian government in recent decades that are consistent with the implementation of a coordinated propaganda effort by the US and the UK involving false flag actions and constructed events designed to implicate Russia, discredit it in international forums and the media, and isolate it from the international community. Key incidents that many suspect fall into this category include allegations of Russian government responsibility in the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko, poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, downing of flight MH17 over Ukraine, poisoning of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, destruction of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines, and involvement electoral meddling and hacking.

Collectively, these events reveal pattern of deceit and manipulation consistent with the tactics of the Integrity Initiative, a propaganda network backed by the UK government (see above). A fact that has been pointed out by many who have questioned the validity of the evidence and the intentions behind these charges, such as:

The Russian government has strenuously and repeatedly denied responsibility for these events. However, as with the Douma gas attack accusations against Syrian government mentioned above, these protestations have been largely ineffective in the face of the global media and institutional dominance the US, UK and NATO have been able to bring to bear. For instance, following the Skripal affair, the UK government expelled 23 Russian diplomats and many other Western nations also expelled Russian diplomats in support of the UK’s actions. The success of these events from a US War Machine perspective has enabled a succession of sanctions to be implemented against Russia and Russian people, which have culminated in those implemented under the guise of punishing Russia for its Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine in February 2022.

During the first year of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine, Russia’s defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, warned the US, UK, France and Turkey about potential Ukrainian provocation with a ‘dirty bomb’. Shoigu asserted that Ukrainian forces were planning to deploy a radioactive weapon with the UK’s assistance.

“Update(1645ET): A major new and sensational charge of a Ukrainian false flag plot in the making issued by Russia’s defense chief has set off a string of tit-for-tat accusations and statements Sunday.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed in rare phone calls that included his counterparts from the United States, Britain, France, and Turkey that Ukrainian forces are preparing a “provocation” with a radioactive device. A Kremlin statement cited that he conveyed a warning over “possible Ukrainian provocations involving a ‘dirty bomb'”.

Shoigu’s office said in follow-up that he conveyed the warning to all the above-named countries’ defense chiefs.”

Source: ZeroHedge

In the event, no dirty bomb was deployed and, granted the Russian accusations were accurate, this would imply their warning and exposure of the plan was successful in preventing the planned action.

f. Military Conquest

Targeted countries have attempted to stave off military invasion by enhancing their defense capacities and forging alliances with other countries to ward off US and Western aggression. Some have achieved this through intensive spending on military equipment and manpower to fend off possible attackers—Iran has created a robust missile program to serve as a deterrence against any US or Israeli assaults. To improve their defense capabilities, countries have looked to form alliances with other nations—Iran has forged strategic alliances with Russia and China for scientific assistance and military equipment. As well as developing a strong military force and nuclear deterrent capability, North Korea has established close connections with China, which supports the country diplomatically and offers it financial assistance.

Having been invaded, a number of nations have after many years, and often at great cost to their people, been able to force the US and allied nations to withdraw. Specific examples of nations that have managed this include:

Iraq: Although though the US was not forced to leave Iraq by the country’s citizens, years of popular opposition to the American military presence put pressure on both the Iraqi and US governments to reach a withdrawal accord. Iraqis were increasingly opposed to the US military presence because they saw it as an occupation rather than a liberation. There were protests and demonstrations in opposition to the US military’s operations in Iraq, notably the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities. Under a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed with the Iraqi government in 2008, the US government agreed to withdraw its troops from Iraqi cities by June 2009 and the entire nation by the end of 2011.

Afghanistan: A variety of circumstances and forces contributed to the US departure from Afghanistan. The circumstances that ultimately resulted in the US pullout from Afghanistan was greatly influenced by the Taliban. They had managed to come together again and wage a persistent insurgency against the Afghan government and its allies, eventually taking over more of the nation. This insurgency undermined the Afghan government’s legitimacy, degraded its security forces, and made it harder for the US and its partners to advance their goals in the nation. The US military’s operations, which included drone attacks and night raids, resulted in a substantial number of civilian casualties and sparked intense resentment among Afghans. This rage was made worse by events like US soldiers burning copies of the Quran and a US soldier killing people in Kandahar in 2012. In the end, the war had lost favor with the American people as it continued for more than 20 years with little sign of a resolution, while the price of the battle in terms of human lives lost and financial resources used had become out of hand. The accords the US and Taliban reached in 2020 made it possible for the US to finally remove its troops from Afghanistan.

Vietnam: The Vietcong and the government of North Vietnam both contributed significantly to the US disengagement from Vietnam. The North Vietnamese government employed a range of tactics, including guerilla warfare, using support from peasants, digging tunnel systems and traps, and surprise assaults on towns and cities in US-held areas in a protracted fight against the American and South Vietnamese forces. To degrade and harass the enemy while simultaneously gaining the favor of the Vietnamese populace, they used hit-and-run strategies, ambushes, and landmines. They transported soldiers, weapons, and supplies from the north to the south, using a network of supply routes known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The North Vietnamese government also sought to wear down the US’s morale and political will to fight by delaying the struggle and avoiding frontal clashes with the better-equipped US force. The Tet Offensive in 1968 proved that the the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces had not been vanquished and were still capable of mounting massive assaults, which marked a turning point in the war. These pressures brought the US under increasing pressure from its allies and the international community to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict, which led to the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 and the eventual withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam.

g. Civil & Cultural Subversion

In writing about various defenses against civil and cultural subversion, it must be realised that this is a rather challenging and broad-ranging topic that needs to consider a range of limitations, blind spots and biases an outside observer necessarily has, especially if one has not spent time in the countries concerned or have direct experience through relationships with a resident of the country. Such factors might include lack of cultural context, incomplete information, limited insight into local perspectives, the risk of stereotyping, political sensitivities, language barriers, ethical considerations and the dynamic nature of culture. This is complicated even more by internal politics which when added to historical racial, ethnic and class dynamics of the nations concerned and the overlay of propaganda from both sides can make the whole issue difficult to untangle and particular measures to combat such subversion subject to debate as to necessity and motivation. With this in mind, I propose to deal with the issue of subversion in a separate article.

Nevertheless, it is evident that many targeted nations have worked very hard to combat civil subversion by encouraging social cohesion, building solid, impervious institutions and attempting to address the attack vectors commonly used by the US War Machine to weaken civil and cultural institutions. In brief, these measures include:

  • Counterintelligence and cybersecurity: Investment in counterintelligence efforts to detect and prevent foreign espionage and influence operations within the country. Also institute dedicated cybersecurity forces to protect local infrastructure and sensitive data.
  • Crackdown on civil society and activism: Close down or limit the operations of Western based civil society organisations and NGOs. Identify and target domestic activists, human rights defenders and dissidents thought to be influenced by such agencies.
  • Economic self-reliance: Pursuit of policies to reduce economic dependence on Western countries, such as efforts to bolster domestic industries, establish trade partnerships with non-Western nations, and reduce reliance on Western technology and products.
  • Education and ideological control: Promotion of ideological conformity by enforcing patriotic education and encouraging loyalty to the government and local indigenous institutions and religious practices.
  • Foreign influence and diplomacy: Countering Western influence by building alliances and partnerships with countries that share its interests. Investment in global image and “soft power” diplomacy, promoting national culture, language and media internationally.
  • Global media influence: Investments in global media outlets and content production to shape international narratives about the country. Setting up state-backed media organisations, such as CGTN (China Global Television Network), RT and Sputnik Radio to provide an alternative perspectives.
  • Legal framework and legislation: Passing laws to address national security concern which grant authorities broad powers to suppress dissent and subversion.
  • Media and Content Regulation: Maintain tight control over the media, including newspapers, television and online content. Enforce strict censorship, including blocking or limiting the dissemination of content that challenges the government’s narrative or promotes Western values. Setup Internet censorship and surveillance to restrict access to foreign websites, social media platforms and content deemed subversive. Development and promotion of domestic alternatives to Western social media and communication platforms, such as Weibo, WeChat, Yandex and Telegram.
  • Promotion of nationalism and indigenous cultural and religious values: Use anti-American rhetoric and emphasise the importance of national sovereignty to build a sense of unity and resilience against perceived Western subversion while emphasising moral and religious deficits in the Western values as a means to build social cohesion and deflect criticism from foreign influences.
  • Regional influence and alliances: Expand influence in the nation’s region through alliances and support for like-minded groups as a way to counter Western interests in the region.
  • Support for Pro-Government Movements: Support and fund pro-government and pro-religious movements and organisations to counteract any perceived Western-led efforts to undermine the government.

Overall, the effectiveness of these measures would appear to vary widely. Some nations fail entirely and become victims to regime change operations, while others—such as Syria—are taken to the very brink of collapse before being rescued (by Russia in the case of Syria) and finally take the actions needed to strengthen their nation’s resilience to such attacks. As pointed out in my article China: On the Balance of Evils, many actions taken by the governments of targeted nations inevitably lay them open to propaganda attacks which position their defensive actions as repression of civil liberties, indoctrination and human rights violations. In many cases, these accusations may even have a basis in fact, given that the actions necessary to counter such attacks on their societies may indeed entail taking doing things that negatively affect rights and liberties. Forcing the target government to do so is part of the attack strategy and target governments need to be aware of this balance.

Conclusion

The mechanisms of the hybrid warfare techniques employed by the US War Machine require a range of responses. Sometimes nations targeted simply lack the resources and knowledge about what they are facing to respond in time, while others—in recent times, such as Iran, China, Venezuela and Russia—have been relatively successful in resisting and maintaining their independence and have started forging new structures like BRICS, which emphasise mutual support while respecting national sovereignty.

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